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Rufo's Law, Example and Explanation

I'm back.

I don't know if someone has already claimed this one, but if not, I'm calling nomenclature rights. As such, I define Rufo's Law as follows:

When it comes to theoretical work of any type, the more widely "assumed" a certain argument, concept, or thinker is, the less that argument, concept, or thinker is actually understood.

Less Josh think I'm talking about his recent discussion of phonocentrism, I'm not really, or at least that wasn't the inspiration for this post. Sure, I do think that far too much of Derrida is now "assumed" and, concomitantly, rather horribly misunderstood. Derrida will remain one of the more complicated philosophers, rich in reward, for some time, and I suspect he will be read and re-interpreted long after others of his day have passed from the collective consciousness. I do not think we have even begun to read Derrida - but that is an issue for a different post.

Nothing Derrida-related prompted the declaration of Rufo's Law. No, the actual inspiration came from a series of comments about Baudrillard, scattered across the intertubes and a random aside in article I recently read. Baudrillard is one of those people who routinely suffer from what I call "drive-by parentheticals," wherein an article wants to assert some commonly "assumed" fact that Baudrillard might commonly be "assumed" to provide, and so randomly inserts Baudrillard into a footnote or parenthetical citation. In effect, we see comments like, "given the proliferation of simulacra (Baudrillard 1994), yada yada." That's the drive-by - academic style.

As someone who has read a lot of Baudrillard and who has sustained a keen interest in his work despite moments in which I withdraw, look elsewhere, or even recoil, I am still amazed at how little even self-proclaimed fans of his work actually understand him. For the vast majority of commentators, the Baudrillard they know is that of Simulations, or Simulacra and Simulations, or Seduction, or Silent Majorities. Sure, they saw a Cool Memories volume once or twice in a university bookstore, and some of them even stumbled upon The Transparency of Evil, almost by accident (the irony). And of course, they read the Internet version of Baudrillard's 9-11 essay. And most are aware that he and Foucault fought about something or other. But even these other encounters simply orbit the mainstays of what is assumed to be Baudrillard's standardized corpus, which, strangely enough, are the middle, transitional texts in his work. Ignored and unattended are the beautiful and essential earlier works on political economy and symbolic exchange, and "assumed" are the later works on evil, the end, and virtual reality. You can hear their inner voices as they flip quickly through the pages of a random JB text in Borders, or see the cover flash by on their "Amazon recommends" pages: "Been there, done that, it's all simulacra, baby. We've heard it all before. Now how about this shiny Badiou book instead?"

Unfortunately, Rufo's Law is here in full effect. And the assumed Baudrillard is, not surprisingly, the most often misunderstood and misappropriated Baudrillard. The irony, of course, is that this sort of academic game is precisely the sort of simulational theoretical enterprise that Baudrillard decried, and the one that prompted him to change his writing style after Symbolic Exchange and Death to one more allusional rather than referential, and more poetic than academic.

Baudrillard needs to be re-read and re-engaged, I think. He is too often folded into Deleuzian readings or "corrected" by Zizekian analysis, as if Baudrillard hadn't already laid out thorough, nuanced, and rather impressive criticisms of the internal heuristic limits of both the desiring machine and psychoanalysis. He is said to ignore class conditions and the necessity of Marxist critique, as well as the reality of suffering, even as he spends entire books detailing his objections to Marxism and essay after essay explaining the role of the reality-principle in the portrayal of suffering. He is declared a (bad) nihilist and a misogynist, as if he never accounted for and addressed criticism of his work after the 80s, and as if he never further extended and enriched his analysis. That this sort of short-thrift, simulation-via-assumption engagement has become so commonplace, and that it confirms much of his take-down of critical theory, should hardly be surprising. If anything, it seems banal, perhaps even oafish, to take note of it. Nevertheless...

Comments (5)

james:

Yea!!! You're back. This is a good sign--this is a getting-settled-comfortably-in-your-new-town sign.

You should write a euology for JB--something like this, but longer--and submit it somewhere. btw, does anybody read "Symbolic Exchange and Death" anymore? Because that's a good damn book. Better than stupid, stupid "Brothers Karamazov." {I realize this is totally off-topic, but I'm gonna write it anyway--and, honestly, I think that Rufo's law totally appliles to Dostoevsky, as well]. At least the inevitable crushing doom in "Symbolic Exchange" wasn't avoidable. That drunk ass punk, Dmitri, makes me want to scream.

Confirmations of Rufo's Law:

(1) Nietzsche - anything having to do with nihilism

(2) Lacan - anything having to do with the gaze

(3) Zizek - "the task today is not to act"

(4) Godel - any reference in any humanities journal to anything he ever wrote

(5) Heisenberg - see Godel

(6) Einstein / relativity - see Heisenberg

(7) Butler - anything having to do with drag

(8) Habermas - any reference to the "ideal speech situation" that is not of the form proposition p, where p is semantically equivalent to "in Between Facts and Norms, Habermas leaves behind the ideal speech situation"

Yes but shouldn't it be, "Lest Josh think I'm talking..."?
Great to see you posting again, Ken.

Josh:

hoooraaaayyy!!! Glad to see you are back, sorry for noticing a month late :-(

Your argument here is irrefutable, I think, not just with regard to Baudrillard, but any thinker.

I've been taken to reading more Derrida for current research, and . . . well, I see a similar problem--one which reading Badrillard certainly raises: these people are dynamic thinkers who wrote over a LONG period of time. Thought moves. Ideas are dynamic. Ideas change over time.

I've been thinking lately that we tend to read our gurus un-dynamically, like static-ly (is there a word for this kind of reading?). How do we do criticism while acknowledging the movement of ideas? The unsettledness of thought . . . it's just very though to peg some of these thinkers down to, well, a series of "talking points."

Sound-bite-ism is "drive-by" theory today. The trouble is that the demands of publication (social scientific demands) don't allow us dymanimic/performative writing (at least in comm studies). The presumed audience constrains writing with reference to these thinkers (again, in "our field" . . . but I suspect others as well).

Is it the demands of publication that constrain the possibilities of dynamic/performative writing or the shape of the writing itself? There's such an assumed permanence to different, written claims, a hard shell of Very Important Observations Being Made--leaving very little space to re-member or re-read the theoretical journeys of theorists, the theoretical explorations of our colleagues, the theoretical imaginings of our students. Once something is written down, it seems, there is less and less room to stretch... or, at least, that's the shape of academic writing style today. With drive-by theory, consistency is a lot easier to achieve and maintain--precisely because it erases all the difficult, changeable bits and replaces them with easy-to-parse, sentence-shaped conclusions.

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